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Case Comments

Decisions of International Foreign Tribunals
International Court of Justice
FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASES
(United Kingdom v. Iceland; FederalRepublic of Germany v. Iceland)
United Kingdom v. Iceland

At the public sitting held on January 5, 1973, the International Court of
Justice heard Sir Peter Rawlinson, Attorney-General, counsel for the Government of the United Kingdom, on the subject of the Court's jurisdiction
to deal with the case concerning FisheriesJurisdiction.

On February 2, 1973, the Court delivered its judgment on the question
of its jurisdiction in this case, finding by fourteen votes to one, that it had
jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the United Kingdom on
April 14, 1972 and to deal with the merits of the dispute. The president
of the Court appended a declaration to the judgment, Judge Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice appended a separate opinion, and Judge Padilla Nervo a
dissenting opinion.
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT
RE-SUMt OF THE PROCEEDINGS (PARAS. 1- 12 OF THE JUDGMENT)

After giving a r~sum6 of earlier proceedings in the case,1 the Court
*B.A. (1940) and LL.B. (1942), Tulane University; member, American, Inter-American,
Lousisiana State, New Orleans (member, Executive Committee) and Federal Bar Associations, American Judicature Society and Maritime Law Association; president (1972- ), New
Orleans Chapter, Federal Bar Association; president (1957- 1959), Phi Delta Phi International Legal Fraternity.
1
See, e.g., 6 INT'L LAW. 665 (July, 1972) and 889-95 (Oct., 1972), and 7 INT'L LAW.
232 (Jan., 1973).
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observed that the Government of Iceland had failed to appear to plead the
objections to the Court's jurisdiction which it is understood to entertain,
but that the Court, in accordance with its Statute and its settled jurisprudence, must examine the question on its own initiative, a duty reinforced
by Article 53 of the Statute whereby, whenever one of the parties does not
appear, the Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction before finding
on the merits. In so doing, it avoided not only all expressions of opinion on
matters of substance, but also any pronouncement which might prejudge or
appear to prejudge any eventual decision on the merits.
COMPROMISSORY CLAUSE OF THE 1961 EXCHANGE OF NOTES
(PARAS. 13-25 OF THE JUDGMENT)
To found the Court's jurisdiction, the Government of the United Kingdom relied on an Exchange of Notes which took place between it and the
Government of Iceland on March 11, 1961, following an earlier dispute
over fisheries. By that Exchange of Notes, the United Kingdom undertook
to recognize an exclusive Icelandic fishery zone up to a limit of twelve
miles and to withdraw its fishing vessels from that zone over a period of
three years. The Exchange of Notes featured a compromissory clause, as
follows:
The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the implementation of
the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959, regarding the extension of fisheries
jurisdiction around Iceland, but shall give to the United Kingdom Government six months' notice of such extension, and, in case of a dispute in relation
to such extension, the matter shall, at the request of either party, be referred
to the International Court of Justice.
The Court found that there is no doubt as to the fulfillment by the
Government of the United Kingdom of its part of this agreement or as to
the fact that the Government of Iceland, in 1971, gave the notice provided
for in the event of a further extension of its fisheries jurisdiction. Nor is
there any doubt that a dispute has arisen, that it has been submitted to the
Court by the United Kingdom and that, on the face of it, the dispute thus
falls exactly within the terms of the compromissory clause.
The Court concluded that it is thus apparent that the Court has jurisdiction.
VALIDITY AND DURATION OF THE 1961 EXCHANGE OF NOTES
(PARAS. 24-45 OF THE JUDGMENT
The Court next considered whether, as had been contended by Iceland,
the agreement embodied in the 1961 Exchange of Notes either was initially
void or has since ceased to be operative.
In a letter of May 29, 1972, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland
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said that the 1961 Exchange of Notes had taken place at a time when the
British Royal Navy had been using force to oppose the 12-mile fishery
limit. The Court, however, noted that the agreement appears to have been
freely negotiated on the basis of perfect equality and freedom of decision
on both sides.
In the same letter, the Minister also expressed the view that "an undertaking for judicial settlement cannot be considered to be of a permanent
nature," and the Government of Iceland had indeed, in an aide-m6moire of
August 3 1, 197 1, asserted that the object and purpose of the provision for
recourse to judicial settlement had been fully achieved. The Court pointed
out, however, that the compromissory clause contains no express provision
regarding duration; and that, in fact, the right of the United Kingdom to
challenge before the Court any claim by Iceland to extend its fisheries zone
was subject to the assertion of such a claim and would last so long as
Iceland might seek to implement the 1959 Althing Resolution.
In a statement to the Althing (the Parliament of Iceland) on November
9, 1971, the Prime Minister of Iceland alluded to changes regarding "legal
opinion on fisheries jurisdiction." His argument appeared to be that as the
compromissory clause was the price that Iceland had paid at the time for
the recognition by the United Kingdom of the 12-mile limit, the present
general recognition of such a limit constituted a change of legal circumstances that relieved Iceland of its commitment. The Court observed that,
on the contrary, since Iceland has received benefits from those parts of the
agreement already executed, it behoves it to comply with its side of the
bargain.
The letter and statement just mentioned also drew attention to "the
changed circumstances resulting from the ever-increasing exploitation of
the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland." It is, noted the
Court, admitted in international law that if a fundamental change of the
circumstances which induced parties to accept a treaty radically transforms
the extent of the obligations undertaken, this may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground for invoking the termination or
suspension of the treaty. It would appear that in the present case, there is a
serious difference of viewsbetween the parties as to whether developments
in fishing techniques in the waters around Iceland have resulted in fundamental or vital changes for that country. It was the Court's opinion,
however, that changes would be relevant only for any eventual decision on
the merits, and that it cannot be said that the change of circumstances
alleged by Iceland had modified the scope of the jurisdictional obligation
agreed to in the 1961 Exchange of Notes. Moreover, any question as to the
jurisdiction of the Court, deriving from an alleged lapse of the obligation
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through changed circumstances, is for the Court to decide, by virtue of
Article 36, paragraph 5, of its Statute.
Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland
At the public sitting held on January 8, 1973, the International Court of
Justice heard Professor Jaenicke, agent and counsel for the Government of
the Federal Republic of Germany, on the subject of the Court's jurisdiction
to deal with that case concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction.

On February 2, 1973, the date of its judgment in the United Kingdom
case, the Court also delivered its judgment on the question of its jurisdiction in the captioned case, finding by fourteen votes to one, that it had
jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the Federal Republic on
June 5, 1972 and to deal with the merits of the dispute. The president of
the Court appended a declaration to the judgment, Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice appended a separate opinion, and Judge Padilla Nervo a dissenting
opinion.
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT RESUMI OF THE PROCEEDINGS
(PARAS. 1- 13 OF THE JUDGMENT)

After reviewing the earlier proceedings in the case, the Court noted the
proceedings instituted against Iceland by the United Kingdom on April 14,
1972 in the case concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (supra), and that the

composition of the Court in the instant case included a judge of United
Kingdom nationality, and therefore decided, by eight votes to five, that
there was in the present phase concerning the jurisdiction of the Court, a
common interest in the sense of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute
which justified the refusal of the request of the Federal Republic of Germany for the appointment of a judge ad hoc.
To support the jurisdiction of the Court, Germany relied (a) on an
Exchange of Notes between the Government of the Federal Republic and
the Government of Iceland dated July 19, 1961, and (b) on a declaration
for the purpose of securing access to the Court, in accordance with a
Security Council resolution of October 15, 1946, which it made on October 29, 1971 and deposited with the Registrar of the Court on November
22, 1971. On July 28, 1972 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland
pointed out in a telegram that the Federal Republic had thus accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court only "after it had been notified by the Government of Iceland, in its aide-m6moire of August 31, 1971, that the object
and purpose of the provision for recourse to judicial settlement of certain
matters had been fully achieved." The Court observed that the binding
2

See, e.g., 6

INT'L LAW.

889-95 (Oct., 1972) and 7 INT'L LAW. 232 (Jan., 1973).
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force of the 1961 Exchange of Notes bears no relation to the date of
deposit of the declaration required by the Security Council resolution and
that the Government of the Federal Republic had complied with the terms
both of the resolution in question and of Article 36 of the Rules of Court.
As was true in the United Kingdom case, the Court also concluded that
although the Government of Iceland had failed to appear to plead the
objections to the Court's jurisdiction which it is understood to entertain,
the Court must examine the question on its own initiative, but it avoided
not only all expressions of opinion on matters of substance, but also any
pronouncement which might prejudge or appear to prejudge any eventual
decision on the merits.
COMPROMISSORY CLAUSE OF THE 1961 EXCHANGE OF NOTES
(PARAS. 14-23 OF THE JUDGMENT)
By the 1961 Exchange of Notes, the Federal Republic of Germany
undertook to recognize an exclusive Icelandic fishery zone up to a limit of
twelve miles and to withdraw its fishing vessels from that zone over a
period of less than three years. The Exchange of Notes features a compromissory clause substantially in the same terms as those of the Exchange
of Notes in the prior case involving the United Kingdom.
On the basis of the same reasoning set forth in its decision in the United
Kingdom case, the Court concluded that it is thus apparent that the Court
has jurisdiction in this case.
VALIDITY AND DURATION OF THE 1961 EXCHANGE OF NOTES
(PARAS. 24-25 OF THE JUDGMENT)
The Court next considered whether, as had been contended, the agreement embodied in the 1961 Exchange of Notes either was initially void or
has since ceased to operate. Again, as was true in the prior case, the Court
rejected all possible contentions of the Government of Iceland for the same
reasons stated in the prior decision.
Composition of the Court
On February 8, 1973, the International Court of Justice elected Judge
Manfred Lachs (Poland) to be its president, and re-elected Judge Fouad
Ammoun (Lebanon) as vice-president. Their terms of office as president
and vice-president will come to an end in 1976, when their membership on
the Court is also due to expire.
On February 14, 1973, the Court held a public sitting in the Peace
Palace, The Hague, at which the three new Judges who took office on
February 6 made the solemn declaration provided for in Article 20 of the
Statue of the Court.
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The new Members of the Court are Sir Humphrey Waldock (United
Kingdom), Nagendra Singh (India) and Jos6- Maria Ruda (Argentina). They
replace Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan), Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
(United Kingdom) and Luis Padilla Nervo (Mexico), whose membership
on the Court expired on February 5.
Now that the three new Members have taken office, and the president
and vice-president have been elected, the Court is composed, in order of
precedence, as follows:
Manfred Lachs (Poland)
President
Vice-President Fouad Ammoun (Lebanon)
Isaac Forster (Senegal)
Judges
Andre Gros (France)
Cesar Bengzon (Philippines)
Sture Petr6n (Sweden)
Charles D. Onyeama (Nigeria)
Hardy C. Dillard (United States)
Louis Ignacio-Pinto (Dahomey)
Federico de Castro (Spain)
Platon D. Morozov (USSR)
Eduardo Jim6nez de Ar6chaga (Uruguay)
Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kindom)
Nagendra Singh (India)
Jos6-Maria Ruda (Argentina)
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